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Abstract 
A striking feature of public international financing of natural resource 
development projects in developing economies is the introduction of public 
accountability mechanisms to ensure that these projects comply with social and 
environmental principles and standards. For example, natural resource 
development projects funded through the World Bank group are subject to the 
Inspection Panel mechanism in relation to complaints about the negative social 
and environmental impacts of such projects. As the public international 
financing of such projects is increasingly giving way to private international 
finance, this paper will examine whether similar accountability mechanisms 
have been developed for this type of private international financing for such 
projects. Within this context, the third iteration of the Equator Principles has 
recently been adopted by a growing number of private international financing 
institutions in the ‘project finance’ field, namely, the Equator Principles 
Financial Institutions (EPFIs). By comparing the accountability mechanisms 
established by public and private international finance institutions against 
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objectively set criteria for such mechanisms, based on the UN’s international 
‘rule of law’ project, this paper will assess whether there has been adequate 
replication of public accountability standards in the movement from public to 
private international financing of natural resource projects, especially within 
developing economies.  
 
Introduction 
As humankind’s global search for natural resources both widens and deepens 
across the world, the international finance packages for funding resource 
development projects in remote developing countries, situated far away from 
the final market destinations of these resources, have become ever more 
intricate. A number of different forms of international financing mechanisms 
are available for such infrastructure projects, namely, ‘government funding’, 
‘corporate (or on-balance sheet) finance’, and ‘project finance’. In summary, 
arguably the simplest form of international infrastructure financing is through 
government funding, when a national government chooses to fund some or all 
of the capital investment in a project and looks to the private sector to bring in 
expertise and efficiency. This is generally the case in a so-called ‘Design-Build-
Operate’ project where the operator is paid a lump sum for completed stages of 
construction and will then receive an operating fee to cover operation and 
maintenance of the project. In the corporate (or on-balance sheet) finance 
model, the private operator finances some of the capital investment for the 
project through corporate financing – which involves the private operator 
getting finance for the project based on the balance sheet of that private 
operator. This is typically the mechanism used in lower value projects where 
the cost of the financing is not significant enough to warrant a project financing 
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mechanism (summarized below) or where the operator is so large that it 
chooses to fund the project from its own balance sheet. The benefit of corporate 
finance is that the cost of funding will be the cost of funding of the private 
operator itself and so it is typically lower than the cost of funding of project 
finance. It is also less complicated than project finance. However, there is an 
opportunity cost attached to corporate financing because the company will only 
be able to raise a limited level of finance against its equity (debt to equity ratio) 
and the more it invests in one project the less it will be available to fund or invest 
in other projects.  Finally, one of the most common - and often most efficient - 
financing arrangements for public-private partnership (PPP) projects is ‘project 
financing’, also known as ‘limited recourse’ or ‘non-recourse’ financing. Project 
financing normally takes the form of limited recourse lending to a specifically 
created project company/entity (also known as a special purpose vehicle (SPV)) 
which has been awarded the right to carry out the construction and operation 
of the project. It is typically used in a new build or extensive refurbishment 
situation and so the SPV has no existing business. The SPV will be dependent 
on revenue streams from the contractual arrangements and/or from tariffs 
from end users which will only commence once construction has been 
completed and the project is in operation. It is therefore a risky enterprise and 
before they agree to provide financing to the project the lenders will want to 
carry out an extensive due diligence on the potential viability of the project and 
a detailed review of whether the project risk allocation protects the project 
company sufficiently. This is known commonly as verifying the project’s 
“bankability”. The increasing popularity of this form of international financing 
model for large infrastructure projects will be the focus of this paper in terms 
of the public accountability of these SPVs, as well as the private international 
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finance institutions that are their lenders.1 
 
Prior to embarking on the above analysis, it is also important to note that new 
international financing models are being contemplated and implemented all 
the time. For example, the Resource Financed Infrastructure (RFI) initiative is 
latest type of international finance vehicle being contemplated by international 
finance policy decision-makers. The World Bank’s Public-Private 
Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF) describes the RFI model as ‘a 
contractual arrangement that permits governments to link expected revenues 
from production rights granted to investors for the development of natural 
resources, to a loan for construction of unassociated infrastructure today. In the 
RFI model, the government pledges its future revenues from the resources to 
finance the development of infrastructure.’ 2  However, like many other 
international financing models being utilized for major infrastructure 
development and maintenance projects within developing economies, legal and 
institutional challenges arise, especially in relation to public accountability for 
these projects. 3  International investment risk management is a significant 
                                                        
1 See: ‘Major Financing Mechanisms for Infrastructure Projects’, in World Bank Group et al, 
Public-Private Partnership in Infrastructure Resource Center, at: 
http://ppp.worldbank.org/public-private-partnership/financing/mechanisms#corporate 
2  http://www.ppiaf.org/feature-story/resource-financed-infrastructure-discussion-new-form-
infrastructure-financing 
3 Halland, Ha ̊vard, John Beardsworth, Bryan Land, and James Schmidt, Resource Financed 
Infrastructure: A Discussion on a New Form of Infrastructure Financing. World Bank Studies. 
Washington, DC: World Bank (2014) Accessible from: http://www-
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aspect of all these public/private international financing arrangements, with 
the diversity and extent of different types of risk being important factors to be 
considered in any international finance package. Among these different types 
of investment risks, both social resilience and environmental protection are 
increasingly becoming imperative considerations. As these social and 
environmental risks become a central plank of the international financial 
planning process for these types of projects, the inability of domestic 
government structures to adequately address these types of risks in itself 
becomes a significant political risk factor within any international financial 
decision-making process. The actual (or perceived) inadequacies of domestic 
governmental accountability mechanisms has resulted in the prescription of 
international governance systems to take their place. 
 
Thus, a striking feature of public international financing of natural resources 
development projects in developing economies is the introduction of public 
accountability mechanisms to ensure that these projects comply with social and 
environmental principles and standards. For example, natural resource 
development projects funded through the World Bank group are subject to the 
Inspection Panel mechanism in relation to complaints of the negative social and 
environmental impacts of such projects. As the public international financing 
of such projects increasingly acts in tandem with private international finance 
mechanisms (summarized above), this paper will first examine whether similar 
                                                        
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/06/06/00033303
7_20140606143941/Rendered/PDF/884850PUB0Box300EPI2102390May292014.pdf 
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public accountability mechanisms have been established for projects relying on 
this type of private international financing. Within this context, a third iteration 
of the Equator Principles (EP) has recently been adopted by a growing number 
of private international financing institutions in the project finance field, 
namely, the Equator Principles Financial Institutions (EPFIs). By comparing 
the accountability mechanisms established by public and private international 
finance institutions against objectively set criteria for such mechanisms, based 
on the UN’s international ‘rule of law’ project, this paper will assess whether 
there has been adequate replication of public accountability standards in the 
movement from public to private international financing options for natural 
resource projects, especially within developing economies. 
 
Prior to engaging fully with these accountability mechanisms, this paper will 
first consider the separate but recent United Nations (UN) engagement with the 
international ‘rule of law’ project and in particular, attempts to assimilate the 
‘rule of law’ into the sustainability objective of UN development goals. The 
challenge articulated and addressed in this paper is to examine whether the 
international normative framework currently being developed through the 
UN’s international ‘rule of law’ project can be extended to include the private, 
transnational economic actors that have agreed to establish similar 
accountability mechanisms under the Equator Principles. In previous writing 
on the Equator Principles, I postulated the argument that the promulgation of 
these Principles represented a transnational social and environmental norm-
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iteration (as opposed to norm-making) process designed to encompass private 
entities within the ambit of international environmental law.4  
 
In this paper, the analytical focus shifts to an examination of the grievance 
mechanisms mandated upon private, international finance institutions under 
the Equator Principles. 5  This examination will be undertaken within the 
context of the UN’s international ‘rule of law’ project currently aimed, inter alia, 
at improving public institutional accountability both within and across States. 
Thus far, the international ‘rule of law’ project, and specifically, the UN-
sponsored efforts on its behalf, has shown an appreciation of the need to link 
‘rule of law’ considerations and criteria to those of sustainable development, 
most notably in the enhancement of public participation opportunities within 
governmental decision-making processes to ensure the accountability of public 
authorities for their efforts at achieving sustainable development. More recent 
UN-based activities, especially under the auspices of the UN Environment 
Programme (UNEP) have paved the way towards an ‘environmental rule of 
law’. Following this analytical pathway, it is notable that both (public) 
governmental and (public/private) governance structures are envisaged as 
delivering the ‘environmental rule of law’, thereby allowing the Equator 
Principles to become the focus of this paper in terms of whether these Principles 
                                                        
4  David M. Ong, ‘From ‘International’ to ‘Transnational’ Environmental Law? A Legal 
Assessment of the Contribution of the ‘Equator Principles’ to International Environmental 
Law’, Nordic Journal of International Law (NJIL), Vol.79, Issue 1 (2010) 35-74. 
5 Specifically, Principle 6 of the Equator Principles, which proposes the establishment of local 
grievous mechanisms. 
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can deliver the goods on this front. The present line of enquiry will reflect on 
the public/private nature of the ‘rule of law’ project itself. Specifically, can 
accountability mechanisms established by private, transnational agreements 
such as the Equator Principles assist the delivery of the ‘rule of law’ in relation 
to the social and environmental risks arising from such natural resource 
development projects. Contemplating this apparent dichotomy between public 
and private accountability, it is proposed to re-cast this relationship as one that 
is dialectical in nature, rather than intrinsically public or private in its 
constitutive elements. This dialectical relationship between public and 
privately established accountability mechanisms arguably follows a similar 
dialectic identified within a ‘rule of law’ research project whereby the term 
‘dynamics’ is utilized to refer not only to the increasing international and 
transnational dimensions of rule of law promotion, but also to the interaction 
between the international and domestic levels of law, in an era of international 
and transnational governance. Within this two-way relationship, international 
law and especially international institutions, try to inculcate the development 
of the ‘rule of law’ at the domestic and municipal levels; while at the same time, 
common ‘rule of law’ standards are being sought at the international level 
itself.6 
 
 
 
                                                        
6  Michael Zürn, André Nollkaemper & Randy Peerenboom, Introduction to Rule of Law 
Dynamics in an Era of International and Transnational Governance (CUP, 2012) 
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I. The International ‘Rule of Law’ Project 
 
Writing on the role of the ‘rule of law’ in societies generally, and political orders 
specifically, Fukuyama defines it as ‘a set of rules of behavior, reflecting a broad 
consensus within the society, that is binding on even the most powerful political 
actors in the society, …’7 In this sense, he distinguishes between the ‘rule of law’ 
and the ‘rule by law’, the latter of which he characterizes as law in the form of 
commands issued by the ruler that are not binding on the rule herself. 8 
Similarly, when addressing the rule of law and democracy nexus, a concept note 
by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) 
and the International Development Law Organization (IDLO) draws a 
fundamental distinction between the ‘rule by law’, whereby law is an 
instrument of government and government is considered above the law, and 
the ‘rule of law’, which implies that everyone in society is bound by the law, 
including the government. Essentially, constitutional limits on power, a key 
feature of democracy, requires adherence to the rule of law. 9  However, as 
Walker has recently emphasized, this notion of the ‘rule of law’ as simply the 
converse of the ‘rule of man’ tends to be narrowly focused on the control of 
government and/or other institutions of the State, as opposed to reining in 
                                                        
7 Francis Fukuyama, Political Order and Political Decay, London: Profile Books (2014) at 24. 
8 Ibid. 
9 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) and International Law 
Development Organization (IDLO) Informal Discussion note on ‘Linkages between the Rule of 
Law, Democracy and Sustainable Development’, 19 April 2012, at the Permanent Mission of 
Italy to the UN in New York, USA. 6pp, at 2. Accessible at: 
http://www.idea.int/un/upload/Concept-Note-IDEA-IDLO-Italy-rev-5-0-Final.pdf 
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corporate and other private interest groups.10 Moreover, the traditional ‘rule of 
law’ objective of limiting State power tends to negate the capacity of the State 
to enable private entities to undertake activities hitherto regarded as solely 
within the province of the State, as well as allow market forces to control their 
relationship with the general public, 11  subject to, inter alia, social and 
environmental constraints established by public international law. Mazzucato 
goes even further, arguing recently that through different types of public-
private interaction, States can lead the creation of markets and indeed entire 
new economic landscapes.12  
 
These insightful observations allow us to turn our attention to the specific 
question posed here as to whether, and to what extent, the goals/objectives of 
the international ‘rule of law’ project can be achieved through the intervention 
of private entities, especially in the mitigation of such social and environmental 
risks. Returning to the specification of the ‘rule of law’ for practical purposes, 
Chesterman established at least three possible meanings of the ‘rule of law’, the 
third of which denotes the emergence of a ‘global’ rule of law, constituting a 
normative regime that touches individuals directly without formal mediation 
through existing national institutions.13 It is this third meaning of the ‘rule of 
                                                        
10 Neil Walker, Intimations of Global Law, CUP (2015) at 83. 
11 Walker (2015) ibid., at 83, citing Bruce Z. Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, 
Theory, CUP (2005) 
12 Mariana Mazzucato, ‘The Innovative State: Governments should make markets, not just fix 
them’, Foreign Affairs, Vol.94, No.1 (January/February, 2015) 61-68, at 62-63, & 68. 
13 Simon Chesterman, ‘An International Rule of Law?’ American Journal of Comparative Law, 
Vol. 56, No. 2 (Spring, 2008), 331-361, at 355-56. 
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law’ which resonates most with the focus of this paper, namely, the relationship 
between the international ‘rule of law’ project, the Equator Principles (EP) and 
its members – the Equator Principles Financial Institutions (EPFIs), and the 
accountability of public/private financing of natural resource development 
projects for their social and environmental risks. 
 
As alluded to above, the UN is spearheading global efforts at achieving the ‘rule 
of law’ both within and across States around the world. Both the UN General 
Assembly and the Security Council have addressed the importance of the rule 
of law for the UN and its Member States, the highlights of which are 
summarized here as follows: In 2004, the Secretary-General stressed that for 
the UN, the ‘rule of law’ is ‘a principle of governance, rather than just 
government, in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, 
including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, 
equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with 
international human rights norms and standards. It requires as well measures 
to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of the law, equality before 
the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, 
separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, 
avoidance of arbitrariness, and procedural and legal transparency.’ 14  It is 
noteworthy that even at this early stage of the UN’s project, the
 
‘rule of law’ was 
conceived as a principle of governance, thus denoting a pluralistic attitude to 
                                                        
14 ‘The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies’, Report of the 
UN Secretary-General to the UN Security Council, S/2004/616 (23 August, 2004) at para.6, 
p.4. 
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the multiple forms of accountability required to ensure the application of the 
‘rule of law’ at the international and national levels of jurisdiction. The 
Guidance Note of the Secretary-General on the UN Approach to Rule of Law 
Assistance (2008) then provides overarching guiding principles and a policy 
framework to guide UN rule of law activities at the national level.15 Referring 
explicitly to the 2004 definition of the ‘rule of law’ in his 2009 Guidance Note 
on Democracy, the Secretary-General also added that the UN provides expertise 
and support to ‘the development of legislation and the strengthening of, in 
particular, legislative, executive and judicial institutions under such principles 
to ensure that they have the capacity, resources and necessary independence to 
play their respective roles.’16
 
 
The third annual report of the Secretary-General on ‘Strengthening and 
coordinating United Nations rule of law activities’ 17  informed UNGA 
deliberations on this issue, which were concluded by the adoption of resolution 
66/102 in December 2011, which held that the advancement of the rule of law 
at the national and international levels is essential for, inter alia, sustainable 
                                                        
15 Guidance Note of the UN Secretary-General, UN Approach to Rule of Law Assistance, April, 
2008. Accessible at: 
http://www.unrol.org/files/RoL%20Guidance%20Note%20UN%20Approach%20FINAL.pdf 
16 Guidance Note of the UN Secretary-General on Democracy, at p.7. Accessible at:  
http://www.un.org/democracyfund/sites/www.un.org.democracyfund/files/file_attach/UNS
G%20Guidance%20Note%20on%20Democracy-EN.pdf 
17 A/66/133, 8 August 2011. 
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development. 18  The UN Security Council debate on ‘The promotion and 
strengthening of the rule of law in the maintenance of international peace and 
security’ on 19 January 2012, then addressed the rule of law dimension from 
the angle of its contribution to peaceful coexistence and the prevention of 
armed conflict.19 In March 2012, the Secretary-General issued a further report 
on an action programme for Delivering Justice,20 which prescribed, inter alia, 
policy actions on relevant issues, such as ‘strengthening the rule of law at the 
national level’, as follows:  
 
‘19. Within justice, security and law-making institutions, it is important to 
enhance transparency, accountability and oversight, and to widen participation 
in decision-making processes, in order to build public confidence and trust. In 
this connection: Member States should ensure that their legal frameworks 
include basic principles of open government, such as fiscal transparency, access 
to information, disclosures related to public officials, accountability, remedies 
and oversight mechanisms, protection measures for whistle-blowers and 
witnesses, and public engagement in policy and decision-making, and that such 
legal frameworks are effectively implemented.’ 
 
                                                        
18 UNGA Resolution 66/102, ‘The rule of law at the national and international levels’, adopted: 
9 December, 2011, A/RES/66/102, 13 January, 2012. 
19 Statement by the President of the UN Security Council, S/PRST/2012/1, 19 January 2012. 
20 Report of the Secretary-General, Delivering justice: programme of action to strengthen the 
rule of law at the national and international levels, UNGA Sixty-sixth session, Agenda item 
83, The rule of law at the national and international levels, A/66/749, 16 March 2012. 
Accessible at:  
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Within this context, support for the role of ‘civil society’ and ‘traditional and 
informal justice systems’ in the ‘rule of law’ project is explicitly acknowledged 
as follows: 
  
‘22. The rule of law is strengthened when all individuals are empowered to 
claim their rights, to request effective remedies and to express legitimate 
demands on public institutions for accountability in the fair and just delivery of 
public services. Civil society organizations, including professional associations 
of lawyers, prosecutors and judges, academic and policy research institutions, 
paralegal organizations and advocacy organizations focusing on the rule of law, 
all make important contributions to strengthening services that ensure the rule 
of law, especially by empowering and informing individuals. In this connection: 
Member States should commit themselves to granting all individuals their full 
right to association and assembly, and to supporting civil society organizations 
and giving them the necessary legislative and political space to thrive. … 
23. Member States may have justice mechanisms based on tradition, custom or 
religion operating alongside State institutions. These systems can play an 
important part in the delivery of justice services, including the adjudication and 
determination of disputes. In this connection:  
(a) Member States and the United Nations should ensure that all laws and 
justice mechanisms, including traditional and informal justice mechanisms, are 
in line with international norms and standards;  
(b) Member States should develop strategies for clarifying and strengthening 
the relationship between traditional and informal justice systems and formal 
justice systems;  
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(c) Member States should develop strategies for ensuring that everyone, 
particularly women and those belonging to vulnerable or otherwise 
marginalized groups, enjoys equal access to justice within all justice delivery 
mechanisms.’  
 
Significantly for our purposes in this paper, the UN Secretary-General also 
explicitly acknowledged the ‘rule of law’ as an essential component when 
‘fostering an enabling environment for sustainable human development’, as 
follows:  
 
‘26. Sustainable human development is facilitated by a strong rule of law. The 
provision and implementation of stable and predictable legal frameworks for 
businesses and labour stimulate employment by promoting entrepreneurship 
and the growth of small and medium-sized enterprises, and attracting public 
and private investment, including foreign direct investment. The link between 
economic development and the rule of law has long been established. Rising 
inequalities in wealth within and among countries are now a key concern with 
the potential to weaken and destabilize societies. The United Nations supports 
the development of a holistic sustainable human development agenda that 
addresses the challenges related to inclusive growth, social protection and the 
environment. In such an agenda, the rule of law must play a critical role in 
ensuring equal protection and access to opportunities.’  
 
Curiously, these social and environmental concerns apparently do not 
necessitate inclusion within the next section of the UN action programme, 
namely, ‘strengthening the nexus between the rule of law at the national and 
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international levels.’ Thus, there remains an abiding feeling of disconnection 
between these UN institutional initiatives on the ‘rule of law’ and action on the 
ground, especially in relation to the social and environmental issues of the 
sustainable development agenda. 
 
 
 
II. The Rule of Law and Sustainable Development  
 
Enlarging upon the relationship between the two concepts, it is a truism that 
many facets of the rule of law form essential components of sustainable 
development. As the IDEA and IDLO assert in their note, the rule of law 
provides the normative and institutional framework by which to enable the 
equitable realization of basic rights and fair access to benefits accruing from the 
resources available to the country and its society. It also helps to ensure 
stability, clarity, precision, predictability and transparency in public and 
private law processes including in contractual, commercial and foreign direct 
investment sectors. These processes, if they operate with consistency, fairness 
and on a non-discriminatory basis, help to spur growth, create wealth and 
reduce rent-seeking and corruption.21 As the UN Secretary-General pointed out 
in his Report on ‘Delivering Justice’: ‘Environmental degradation, rapid 
urbanization, conflict, fragility, severe income inequalities and exclusion of 
vulnerable groups constitute major challenges to human development and 
security. Robust principles are needed to underpin the management of our 
                                                        
21 IDEA & IDLO Informal Discussion note (2012), op. cit., at pp.3-4. 
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future. The rule of law is a core principle of governance that ensures justice and 
fairness, values which are essential to our humanity’.22 This approach echoes 
the UN General Assembly’s unequivocal position on the interconnection 
between rule of law and sustainable development: ‘The advancement of the rule 
of law at the national and international levels is essential for the realization of 
sustained economic growth, sustainable development, the eradication of 
poverty and hunger and the protection of all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.’23 The IDEA/IDLO note reiterates that the international community 
has affirmed on many occasions that strengthening the rule of law and bringing 
the law closer to the people are effective tools by which to promote economic 
and social advancement in the global efforts to achieve the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) and to meet other pressing global challenges.24  
 
A further critical element of rule of law approaches to development identified 
by the IDEA/IDLO is the need to empower traditionally marginalized social 
groups, including women, in political decision-making as well as in the 
marketplace, and in particular, though unimpeded access to remedies in case 
of the violation of rights. Development is less likely to take root in a sustainable 
fashion unless reforms are owned by civil society and supported by NGOs, and 
in this connection, the rule of law forms a pivotal point of reference for the 
empowerment and participation of marginalized groups. Empowering people 
                                                        
22 ‘Delivering justice: programme of action to strengthen the rule of law at the national and 
international levels’, 16 March 2012, A/66/749, at para.1. 
23 UNGA, A/RES/66/102 of 13 January 2012. 
24 IDEA & IDLO Informal Discussion note (2012), op. cit., at pp.3-4. 
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to use law and legal processes strengthens the capacity of local communities to 
guarantee access to justice on a fair and non-discriminatory basis. It also allows 
individuals and groups to engage more equitably with justice systems rooted in 
non-state, informal and traditional fora. Considering that these non-state 
systems, including indigenous, customary and religious legal orders, alternative 
dispute resolution mechanisms and popular justice fora, figure as important or 
even principal avenues through which the poor can access justice, engagement 
with such systems to bring them into closer line with international norms and 
standards becomes key to strengthening the rule of law in development 
contexts.25 The IDEA/IDLO note also observed that the past forty years have 
shown that the rule of law at national and international levels can make a 
significant contribution toward forging an enduring partnership between the 
environment and development founded on ecological and social sustainability. 
Judging by the continuing trajectory of rapid environmental degradation and 
natural resource depletion, it is, however, universally recognized that its full 
potential has yet to be realized. Recognizing environmental law as a foundation 
for environmental sustainability and realizing its full potential is ever more 
urgent in our quest towards sustainable development and new economic 
growth, but also towards just and fair societies vis-à-vis growing environmental 
pressures.26 
 
That the rule of law plays an important role in environmental matters was re-
                                                        
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
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affirmed through the Rio+20, UN Conference on Sustainable Development,27 
and UNEP’s World Congress on Justice, Governance and Law for 
Environmental Sustainability,28 both held in June 2012. At the World Congress 
more than 250 of the world’s Chief Justices, Attorneys General and Auditors 
General seized a generational opportunity to contribute to the debates on the 
environment and declare that any diplomatic outcomes related to the 
environment and sustainable development from the Rio+20 Conference, would 
remain unimplemented without adherence to the rule of law, in the form of 
open, just and dependable legal orders. Similarly, the outcome document of 
Rio+20, namely, the UNGA Resolution entitled: ‘Future We Want’,29 reaffirms 
the central role to be played by the rule of law on the path towards sustainable 
development and makes it a prerequisite for a successful transition to greener 
economies. This Resolution also highlights the crucial role played by national 
judiciaries in ensuring fairness and equity in the implementation of policies to 
further sustainable development. These developments are underpinned and 
bolstered by the recently adopted UNGA Resolution on the Rule of Law,30 
which underlines the importance of fair, stable and predictable legal 
                                                        
27 Held at Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, ??-?? June, 2012. Documentation accessible at:  
28 Held at , ??-?? June, 2012. Documentation accessible at:  
29 UNGA Resolution 66/288, adopted on 27 July, 2012. A/RES/66/288 (11 September 2012) 
Accessible at:  
30 A/RES/67/1 
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frameworks for generating inclusive, sustainable and equitable development 
and maintaining peace and security.31  
 
Both the International IDEA and IDLO resolved that the work of the UN must 
link the rule of law, democracy building and sustainable development. Such 
linkages are increasingly emerging in key areas, at least three of which, inter 
alia, are significant for our purposes here, as follows: 
 -state and informal legal and justice systems: How 
can informal justice systems assist in realizing social and economic rights and 
promote inclusive development? To what extent should the international 
community engage with such systems as part of a broader rule of law debate/ 
quest for definition?  

with non-state actors: How could non-state actors, including civil society 
organizations, participate more meaningfully and effectively in processes 
aimed at strengthening the rule of law?  
 -private partnership and the role of the private sector: How can rule 
of law support development through engagement with and integration of 
private and corporate sectors in the development discourse?32  
                                                        
31 UNGA Resolution, 67/1. Declaration of the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on 
the Rule of Law at the National and International Levels, A/RES/67/1, 30 November, 2012. 
Accessible at: http://www.unrol.org/files/A-RES-67-1.pdf 
32 IDEA & IDLO Informal Discussion note (2012) op. cit., at p.6. 
 21 
 
III. From the ‘Rule of Law and Sustainable Development’ to an 
‘Environmental Rule of Law’  
This critical nexus between the rule of law and environmental sustainability in 
the context of sustainable development was then highlighted by the World 
Congress on Justice, Governance and Law for Environmental Sustainability 
that UNEP organized on the eve of the Rio+20 Conference, in 2012. At this 
World Congress, which has been described as the most encouraging and 
progressive work of Rio+20 from a legal perspective,33
 
over 250 of the world’s 
Chief Justices, Attorneys General and Auditors General seized a generational 
opportunity to contribute to the debates on the environment and declare that 
any diplomatic outcomes related to the environment and sustainable 
development, including from Rio+20, would remain un-implemented without 
adherence to the rule of law, in the form of open, just and dependable legal 
orders.34  
This was followed by UNEP Governing Council Decision 27/9, on ‘Advancing 
Justice, Governance and Law for Environmental Sustainability’, adopted by the 
first universal session of UNEP’s Governing Council in February 2013,35 which 
recognized the growing importance of rule of law in the field of the environment 
                                                        
33  Ann Powers, ‘The Rio+20 Process: Forward Movement for the Environment?’,  
Transnational Environmental Law, Vol.1, Issue 2 (October, 2012)  at 403-412, at 412. 
34  
35 Accessible at: http://www.unep.org/delc/Portals/24151/Documents/Decisisions27-
9Advancing_Justice_Governance&Law.pdf 
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in order to reduce violations of environmental law and to achieve sustainable 
development overall. Decision 27/9 is the first internationally negotiated 
document to utilize the term ‘environmental rule of law’, requesting the UNEP 
Executive Director, inter alia, ‘(t)o lead the United Nations system and support 
national Governments upon their request in the development and 
implementation of environmental rule of law with attention at all levels to 
mutually supporting governance features, including information disclosure, 
public participation, implementable and enforceable laws, and implementation 
and accountability mechanisms including coordination of roles as well as 
environmental auditing and criminal, civil and administrative enforcement 
with timely, impartial and independent dispute resolution; …’36 The constituent 
elements of environmental rule of law can be said to include, inter alia, 
adequate and implementable laws, access to justice and information, public 
participation, accountability, transparency, liability for environmental damage, 
fair and just enforcement, and human rights. 37  Inclusion of the phrase 
‘mutually supportive governance features’ is arguably both recognition as well 
as paving the way for these collective environmental rule of law services to be 
facilitated by private entities, either alongside, or possibly even in place of 
traditional public authorities. Here is where the grievance mechanisms 
                                                        
36 Para.6(a) of Decision 27/9, adopted at the Twenty-seventh session of the Governing Council/ 
Global Ministerial Environment Forum, Nairobi, 18–22 February 2013, UNEP/GC.27/17, 12 
March, 2013. (emphasis added) 
37  See 1st Asia-Pacific International Colloquium on Environmental Rule of Law, Putrajaya 
Statement, Putrajaya, Malaysia, 12 December, 2013. Accessible at:    
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envisaged by the Equator Principles can be located within the broad context of 
the rule of law and sustainable development of natural resources.   
 
Implementation of UNEP Governing Council decision 27/9, 
UNEP/Env.Law/MTV4/MR/1/2/Add.1, 20 August 2015, Report on the implementation of the 
Fourth Programme for the Development and Periodic Review of Environmental Law 
(Montevideo Programme IV) for the period 2010–2014. Meeting of senior government officials 
expert in environmental law on the midterm review of the  
fourth Programme for the Development and Periodic Review of Environmental Law 
(Montevideo Programme IV) Montevideo, 7–11 September 2015. Accessible at: 
http://www.unep.org/delc/Portals/119/documents/montevideo/addendum-gc27-9.pdf 
 
Institutionally, UNEP has continued to pursue the ‘environmental rule of law’ 
project through the establishment of a UN Environment Assembly (UNEA), as 
well as the convening of a symposium on the ‘environmental justice and 
sustainable development’ theme in June, 2014 on the occasion of the 1st session 
of the UNEA.38 However, the uneven treatment of the application of the ‘rule of 
law’ continues in the UNEP concept note for this symposium. Although it is 
initially described ‘a central attribute of good governance’, the ‘rule of law’ is 
then held to revert to its traditional role as a constraint to the arbitrary exercise 
of public power, without mentioning its potential utility for constraining private 
power as well. Nor does this description of the ‘rule of law’ appear to allow for 
                                                        
38  Environmental Justice and Sustainable Development - A Global Symposium on 
Environmental Rule of Law, on the occasion of the 1st Session of the United Nations 
Environment Assembly (UNEA), 24 June 2014, Nairobi, Kenya, Preliminary Background Note 
– Version of 3 June 2014. 
Accessible at: http://www.unep.org/unea/docs/background_note_erol.pdf 
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the establishment of grievance mechanisms by private entities, as envisaged by 
the Equator Principles, for example. 
IV. Implementing the ‘Environmental Rule of Law’ through 
Accountability Mechanisms for Public and Private International 
Finance Institutions 
The growing calls for accountability and even responsibility of these public and 
private international finance institutions are being answered through further 
institutional developments. In Policing the Banks, for example, van Putten calls 
for the global accountability of all powerful financial players, including the 
‘transnational’ private banks that are now co-funding, usually alongside public 
international finance institutions, many development projects in third world 
countries. Describing how such private financial institutions have been slow to 
accept responsibility for the consequences of their investments, even when they 
cause significant social and environmental damage in developing countries, she 
argues that new accountability mechanisms are necessary to reduce or prevent 
such damage. Moreover, because such institutions operate on a global scale, 
only semi-judicial accounting mechanisms can provide the necessary 
accountability. According to van Putten, it is time for the private financial sector 
to follow multilateral financial institutions in creating independent 
mechanisms, mediation procedures, and access to decision makers for people 
harmed or potentially harmed by projects financed by their institutions.39  
 
                                                        
39  Maartje van Putten, Policing the Banks: Accountability Mechanisms for the Financial 
Sector, McGill-Queen’s University Press (2008) 
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A. Accountability of Public International Finance Institutions: The 
World Bank Group 
The establishment of World Bank’s Inspection Panel offers lessons for 
advocates of greater accountability for decision-making within both public, and 
increasingly also private, international finance institutions. One of these 
lessons is arguably to focus advocacy policy and campaigning practice not just 
on the institution itself, but also on its own sources of finance. In the case of the 
World Bank, human rights and environmental NGOs targeted both the Bank 
itself but perhaps more significantly, its main donor – the United States (US) 
government and specifically, US congressional leaders who controlled funding 
to World Bank agencies. Indeed, so successful was this NGO lobbying exercise 
that the corresponding pressure placed by the US Congress on World Bank 
accountability for its operational policies and funding strategies has recently 
been held up as an example of how to ensure the democratic legitimacy of 
international organizations generally.40 
 
According to Szablowski, this pressure ultimately resulted in the establishment 
of the Inspection Panel in 1993.41 He observes however that: ‘While the Panel 
                                                        
40  Kristina Daugirdas, ‘Congress Underestimated: The Case of the World Bank’, American 
Journal of International Law (2013) 517-562. 
41 David Szablowski, Transnational Law and Local Struggles: Mining, Communities and the 
World Bank, Hart (2007) at 90-91, citing, inter alia, J A Fox and I D Brown (eds), The Struggle 
for Accountability: The World Bank, NGOs and Grassroots Movements, MIT Press (1998) at 8; 
S Schlemmer-Schulte, The World Bank Inspection Panel: A Record of the First International 
Accountability Mechanism and Its Role for Human Rights’, Human Rights Brief, Vol.6:2 (1998) 
279. 
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operates autonomously of Bank management and with significant public 
transparency, it lacks independence of a judicial institution.’42 Moreover, as 
Fox notes, ‘the panel’s very existence challenges key assumptions of national 
sovereignty’43 by allowing the citizens of borrowing countries (that are hosting 
the projects funded by these international finance institutions) to present their 
claims directly before an international complaints mechanism.44 This last point 
resonates with the aims of the present exercise in seeking to determine possible 
avenues for exerting accountability against these public international finance 
institutions, for compliance with social and environmental protection norms. 
However, it also exposes the potential pitfalls of such an approach, if it is 
perceived to go against the democratically legitimate sovereign decisions of any 
country that chooses to prioritize socio-economic development at the expense 
of certain human rights and environmental protection standards.  
 
On the other hand, Darrow observes that the establishment of the Inspection 
Panel helps ensure that the compliance of both the in-country Task Manager, 
and therefore indirectly also the borrowing country, with the World Bank’s 
Operational Standards, including those on human rights and environmental 
protection. 45  The normative significance of the establishment of such an 
institutional compliance and accountability mechanism, along with the 
                                                        
42 Ibid., at 91. 
43  J A Fox, ‘The World Bank Inspection Panel: Lessons from the First Five Years’, Global 
Governance, Vol.6 (2000)  
44 Szablowski (2007) op. cit., at 91. 
45 Mac Darrow, Between Light and Shadow: The World Bank, The International Monetary 
Fund and International Human Rights Law, Hart (2003) at 143. 
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jurisprudence it has since generated is notable.46 This is especially the case 
when it is observed that, in the performance of its latter function, the Panel is 
the first forum in which individuals can hold an international organization 
directly accountable for the consequences of its failure to follow its own rules 
and procedures. 47  Both the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), as the so-called private 
sector components of the World Bank, are also held accountable to the 
Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman (CAO), which is an independent recourse 
mechanism available to project-affected people. According to Darrow, the 
success of the Inspection Panel in this path-breaking role is evidenced by ‘… the 
establishment of similar grievance mechanisms across a range of other 
international financial institutions’, although he goes on to note that the powers 
of the Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman (CAO) of the International IFC are 
more focused on conciliation and arbitration.48 Both these public international 
finance institutions also have policy commitments that require the 
establishment of grievance mechanisms within their Policy and Performance 
Standards on Social and Environmental Sustainability and Guidance Notes. 
Similar principles are applied in the context of Principle 6 of the EP, which is 
derived from the World Bank approach and will be considered further in the 
next section. However, if a grievance cannot be initially resolved by the local 
                                                        
46 Benedict Kingsbury, ‘Operational Policies of International Institutions as Part of the Law-
Making Process: The World Bank and Indigenous Peoples’, in G Goodwin-Gill & S Talmon (eds) 
The Reality of International Law: Essays in Honour of Ian Brownlie (1999) 323-42, at 332. 
47 D Bradlow, ‘International Organizations and Private Complaints: The Case of the World Bank 
Inspection Panel’, Virginia Journal of International Law Vol.34(3) (1994) 553-613, at 554. 
48 Darrow (2003) op. cit., at 144, fn.148. 
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grievance mechanism established by the IFC or MIGA the complainant may 
refer to an external party such as the court system, traditional systems of justice 
or the CAO. Torrance suggests that within this context, such grievance 
mechanisms are a form of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) that must be 
seen to co-exist with judicial avenues available to complainants. 49   This 
relationship is made clear in the IFC Performance Standards, which requires 
for example that grievance mechanisms must not operate in such a way as to 
foreclose access to judicial remedies for claimants. Any concern or complaint to 
these grievance mechanisms arising from a legitimate stakeholder will also 
foretell of possible legal risks to the borrower and both the public international 
finance institutions (under the IFC Performance Standards) and private 
international financial Institution (under the Equator Principles) involved in 
the project.50   
 
B. The Equator Principles: A Private International Finance 
Accountability Mechanism? 
This section will assess the Equator Principles as a means of implementing the 
environmental rule of law. In doing so, it should be borne in mind that these 
Principles are a form of private, transnational agreement for ensuring 
compliance with international social and environmental norms. However, 
within the context of the ‘environmental rule of law’ project, it is the capacity of 
                                                        
49 Michael Torrance, ‘Grievance Mechanisms and the Equator Principles’, 13 December, 2013, 
posted on Lex Sustineo website, accessible at:  
http://lexsustineo.blogspot.co.uk/2013/02/grievance-mechanisms-and-equator.html 
50 Ibid. 
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the Equator Principles to both provide for, and establish, public accountability 
mechanisms for these social and environmental stakeholders in the resource 
development projects that the EPFIs are involved in that will be scrutinized 
here.   The Equator Principles (EP) is an agreement amongst signatory 
Financial Institutions (known as EPFI) to assess and manage environmental 
and social risks associated with certain project and asset based financings in 
accordance with procedural requirements, internationally accepted standards 
and host country and international laws and regulations. EPFI will not provide 
project-related loans and project finance advisory services within the scope of 
the EP, to projects where the borrower cannot or will not comply with the EP. 
The EP was originally developed in 2003 and then reviewed and revised in 
2006, giving rise to the second iteration, EP II framework. Another review took 
place during 2011-12, culminating in the release of a further revised version of 
the EP agreement known as EP III, adopted by EPFI in early 2013. The release 
of EP III follows a major revision of the World Bank’s IFC Performance 
Standards on Environmental & Social Sustainability in 2012 (hereinafter, IFC 
Performance Standards), a set of guidelines that is incorporated by reference 
into the EP framework. Together, these changes mark an important evolution 
in best practice in sustainable finance of particular importance for both bankers 
and those seeking access to capital.  
 
The IFC Performance Standards that the EP are based upon pertain to the 
management of certain types of environmental and social risks, including (1) 
Labour and Working Conditions (including Occupational Health and Safety); 
(2) Resource Efficiency and Pollution Prevention; (3) Community Health Safety 
and Security; (4) Land Acquisition and Involuntary Resettlement; (5) 
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Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable Management of Living Natural 
Resources; (6) Indigenous Peoples; (7) Cultural Heritage. Human rights risks 
are also addressed through the foregoing aspects of the IFC Performance 
Standards and significant human rights risks may require human rights due 
diligence in accordance with IFC Performance Standard One – Assessment and 
Management of Environmental and Social Risks and Impacts. These IFC 
Performance Standards reflect and embody the ‘sustainable development’ 
mandate of numerous global organizations, including the World Bank and its 
financing arm the IFC, and is enshrined as the explicit object and purpose of 
over 50 treaties. The IFC Performance Standards and the EP were borne out of 
efforts by the World Bank to ensure its private sector partners also took the 
appropriate steps to meet best practice in sustainable development.51 The IFC 
Performance Standards and Equator Principles are also increasingly relevant 
within international trade and investment treaty disputes, in light of increasing 
recognition of concepts/themes such as ‘sustainable development’ and 
‘corporate social responsibility’ in international investment agreements. 52 
Thus, Export Credit Agencies (ECA) may be legally obligated to apply 
environmental and social risk management standards in extending their export 
credit facilities in accordance with the OECD Common Approaches, which 
refers to the IFC Performance Standards. Moreover, the environmental and 
                                                        
51 Equator Principles III: An Introduction and Guide, Norton Rose Fulbright (January 2014) 
at 5. 
52  Norton Rose Fulbright report (2014) ibid., at 6, citing the Canada-Peru Free Trade 
Agreement and role of the Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) of the IFC in 
the Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), before the 
International Court of Justice [2010] I.C.J. Rep. 14. 
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social review process is an ideal time to consider other legal and sustainability 
risks affecting a project, such as corruption and bribery risks.53 
 
In terms of the effectiveness of the EP, the basic statistics are that to date, 80 
EPFIs from 34 countries have committed to the EP. This number is set to grow 
with an emphasis on the inclusion of banks from newly industrializing 
economies, especially those that are lending to investors in emerging markets 
across the world. Weber has examined the compliance records of 79 Equator 
Principles Financial Institutions (EPFI), analysing how often members of the 
EP report and what content should be disclosed in relation to the seven 
mandatory requirements: annual reporting, disclosure of the number of 
transactions, assessment, risk categories, sector, region and implementation.54 
Using institutional theory as the theoretical framework for the analysis, he used 
seven criteria (annual reporting, disclosure of screened transactions, the 
categorization of projects with respect to their assessment status, risk category, 
sector, region and implementation experience) to test whether EPFIs report 
according to the EP’s guidelines. The three main findings from this study are 
first, that all EPFIs that are required to disclose information are compliant, at 
least partially. Second, only about five percent disclose all the information 
required by the EP guidelines, although 85 percent meet at least four out of the 
seven reporting criteria. While the majority of EPFIs report about risk 
                                                        
53 Norton Rose Fulbright report (2014) op. cit., at 6. 
54  Olaf Weber, Equator Principles Reporting: Do Financial Institutions meet their Goals?, 
Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), Canada, Paper No.38, 19 August, 2014. 
Accessible at: https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/no38.pdf 
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categories, sectors and regions, only a minority of these EPFIs report them in a 
way that enables readers to combine the figures and to analyze how risk occurs 
in certain regions and sectors. Moreover, as projects are not usually listed in a 
way that they are identifiable, the reports are non-transparent, making it 
impossible to allocate social and environmental impacts to certain projects, 
sectors and regions. Third, the larger the EPFI, with respect to its total assets, 
and the longer the duration of its membership, the higher is the reporting 
quality. In conclusion, Weber recommends that further mechanisms are 
needed to guarantee transparent reporting of environmental and social project 
finance impacts. These recommendations should include additional 
mechanisms to guarantee that the EPFIs follow the EP’s demands include 
enforcement, standardization reporting or third party validation could help to 
increase the credibility and the transparency of the EP reporting.55 
 
While the EP is an agreement amongst EPFI, many of the obligations of the EP 
must be carried out wholly or in part by borrowers with EPFI oversight. 
Borrower expectations may be set out in contractual agreements between the 
EPFI and borrower, conferring upon the EPFI certain rights and remedial 
avenues should the requirements of the EP not be met by the borrower. Where 
borrowers are unable or will not comply with the EP, no loans are to be 
extended by the EPFI. Where loans are extended, the role of the EPFI is 
analogous to that of a regulator, establishing rules and obligations for 
borrowers and monitoring their implementation, with the possibility of adverse 
consequences (in the form of contractual remedies) being imposed on the 
                                                        
55 Ibid. 
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borrower for non- compliance with EP requirements. 56  The primary legal 
significance of the EP derives from the incorporation of EP obligations into 
contractual relations between the EPFIs and their borrowers through 
covenants. However, it remains an open legal question whether public 
commitments and contractual agreements to apply the EP give rise to third 
party beneficiary rights (such as in relation to Affected Communities) through 
tort or contract law.57 This is due to the structural difficulty in that EPFIs face 
when seeking to ensure that their clients/borrowers implement the Equator 
Principles in the projects they (the EPFI) finance relates to the nature of the 
relationship between the EPFI concerned and the borrowing entity, which 
utilizes the loan to finance the actual project on the ground. While the EPFI 
itself may well be committed to, and in compliance with, the application of the 
Equator Principles, there is an understandable concern as to how far such a 
commitment can be translated into effective action on the environmental and 
social fronts by the borrowing (SPE) project company itself, given that it would 
usually be operating in a separate, foreign territorial jurisdiction from the EPFI 
concerned. Here, the EPFIs’ main compliance mechanism is contractual, 
binding their borrowers to covenants in their funding documentation to comply 
with the relevant international and domestic laws on social and environmental 
issues. 58  Moreover, the EPFIs require borrowers to arrange third-party, 
independent monitoring and reporting of their project financed projects,59 with 
                                                        
56 Ibid., at 5-6. 
57 Norton Rose Fulbright report (January, 2014) ibid., at 6. 
58 Principle 8, of the Equator Principles op. cit. 
59 Principle 9, ibid. 
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the clear implication being that poor performance by the borrowing company 
on the social and environmental fronts can jeopardize future tranches of 
scheduled funding for the project. However, given the repayment structure for 
project finance loans described above, the EPFI concerned may thereby be 
placing its own source of revenues from the repayment of the Project Finance 
loan at risk of default if it impinges too heavily on the operations of the 
borrowing company on social and environmental compliance issues. A further 
source of control that can be exercised by the EPFIs in respect of errant 
borrowers is to blacklist these companies from future project finance-type 
lending. On the other hand, the competitive nature of the project finance 
market and the presence of new entrants (especially from non-Western 
countries) which have not yet been inducted into the ‘Equator Principles’ raises 
possible ‘free rider’ issues and thereby acts as a deterrent against the use of this 
form of sanction. As van Putten notes, ‘… the Equator Principles could still be 
undermined by the fast-increasing flows of foreign direct investment from new 
large investors such as Chinese banks’ 60 , especially within the African 
continent. It is therefore in the interests of the current EPFIs to induce as many 
of these new entrants into accepting the Principles as part of their lending policy 
in order to reduce the potential for ‘free riders’ within the project finance 
lending market.  
 
The next question to be addressed is what, if any, are the compliance-inducing 
or enforcement methods to be employed against the EPFIs themselves for their 
non-compliance with the ‘Equator Principles’? Initially, this question might be 
                                                        
60 van Putten (2008) at 214. 
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considered superfluous given the self-regulatory, non-binding nature of these 
Principles. In this regard, the ‘Disclaimer’ attached to the end of the ‘Equator 
Principles’ list is apposite. It indicates, inter alia, that: ‘…these principles do 
not create any rights in, or liability to, any person, public or private. Institutions 
are adopting and implementing these Principles voluntarily and independently, 
without reliance on or recourse to IFC or the World Bank.’61 Yet the depth of 
the commitment to the Principles by the EPFIs in their PF-type lending 
activities is indicated by the fact that they are willing to lose potential profits by 
withdrawing from PF projects that fail to meet the requirements established by 
these Principles. Moreover, the EPFIs concerned are acutely aware of their 
exposure to NGO, media and general public scrutiny over their lending 
activities. Thus, despite their consensual, rather than compulsory, character, 
most if not all these EPFIs are now able to show a significant level of 
internalization of these Principles within their lending criteria and practice. As 
Meyerstein argues, while measuring how individual EPFIs have changed their 
organizational structures, policies and procedures following adoption of the 
EPs is not a perfect proxy for measuring ground-level impacts, it is a useful 
gauge for the study of how transnational private regulation engages with 
corporate human rights accountability issues.62 Principle 10 also requires these 
EPFIs to commit to publicly available reports, on at least an annual basis, about 
                                                        
61 See ‘The Equator Principles’, op. cit., at p.5. 
62 Ariel Meyerstein, ‘Transnational Private Financial Regulation and Sustainable Development: 
An Empirical Assessment of the Implementation of the Equator Principles’, New York 
University Journal of International Law & Politics, Vol.45 (Winter, 2013) 487-594 (including 
Tables) at 499. 
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its Equator Principles implementation processes and experience. While this 
information requirement will assist others (especially NGOs) to monitor the 
EPFIs’ implementation records in this regard, the voluntary nature of this 
requirement will not prevent ‘shirking’ of responsibilities from occurring.  
 
A further, institutional requirement that emulates, but does not fully replicate, 
the grievance mechanisms epitomized by the World Bank’s Inspection Panel 
and IFC’s CAO, is provided through the Equator Principles in the form of 
Principle 6: Grievance Mechanism. Principle 6 provides inter alia as follows: 
For all Category A projects and Category B projects ‘as appropriate’ that are 
located in non-OECD or non-High Income countries, the borrower is enjoined 
to establish a grievance mechanism; the existence of which the borrower has to 
inform the affected communities. The borrower must create a ‘grievance 
mechanism’ as part of the Environmental and Social Management System 
(ESMS) for the project and it must be designed to receive and facilitate 
resolution of concerns about the project’s environmental and social 
performance. According to (Equator) Principle 6, ‘the grievance mechanism is 
required to be scaled to the risks and impacts of the Project and have Affected 
Communities as its primary user. It will seek to resolve concerns promptly, 
using an understandable and transparent consultative process that is culturally 
appropriate, readily accessible, at no cost, and without retribution to the party 
that originated the issue or concern. The mechanism should not impede access 
to judicial or administrative remedies. The client will inform the Affected 
Communities about the mechanism in the course of the Stakeholder 
Engagement.’  
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The grievance mechanism to be established is thus subject to the following 
qualifiers: 1) this mechanism is scaled to the level of risk and adverse impacts 
of the project; and 2) it is part of the management system. The former qualifier 
is understandable, albeit affording the borrower much discretion to decide on 
the scope and method of the grievance mechanism employed. This is especially 
pertinent when it is considered that Category B projects will be subject to a 
grievance mechanism only ‘as appropriate’, presumably from the borrower’s 
perspective? The second qualifier is subject to more serious concerns, as 
follows: First, it is clear that this mechanism does not have to amount to an 
independent and objective dispute settlement mechanism for addressing 
community grievances. Its explicit attachment to the project management 
system undermines any notion of such objectivity or independence in its 
procedures. Second, there is nothing in this requirement under Principle 6, or 
indeed in the consultation and disclosure requirements under Principle 5, that 
deal with the issue of standing for Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) 
concerned with nature conservation and wildlife protection issues to participate 
in such grievance mechanisms, where these issues are not raised by the ‘affected 
communities’ concerned. Such NGOs will not necessarily be encompassed 
within the definition of ‘affected communities’, except perhaps if they have 
among their membership, individuals from these ‘affected communities’.  
 
Nevertheless, according to the EP Association of EPFIs, the provision of 
grievance mechanisms is a very important component of the EP framework and 
the requirements enable Project Sponsors to proactively address grievances 
and concerns at project level. Here, the EP III aim to reflect the IFC’s current 
thinking on the subject (as detailed in the updated IFC Performance Standards 
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and Guidance Notes). However, questions persist about the adequacy of these 
local grievance mechanisms at both the institutional and implementation levels 
in terms of their relationship (or lack of it) with the EPFIs. First, unlike the 
Inspection Panel and CAO, the grievance mechanisms established under EP 6 
do not provide for accountability against the lending institutions (i.e., the 
EPFIs) themselves. As Richardson observes, the EPFIs do not see the Principle 
6 ‘Grievance Mechanism’ as a formal dispute resolution system that can confer 
obligations or liabilities against them.’63 Second, while the IFC Performance 
Standards and Equator Principles require the ‘project sponsors’ (in other 
words, borrowers from these lending public/private international finance 
institutions) to implement project-level grievance mechanisms, these 
mechanisms are not required to meet any minimum due process standards.64  
This third iteration of the EP (EP III) also introduces ‘human rights’ into the EP 
framework for the first time, to bring them in line with UN and World Bank 
initiatives. As part of the EP updating process for the third iteration of these 
                                                        
63 B. J. Richardson, ‘Financing Sustainability: The New Transnational Governance of Socially 
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Principles (EP III) it was agreed that the updated EP (III) would acknowledge 
the ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the 
United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework’, which were 
developed by John Ruggie, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-
General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises. The Special Representative annexed these Guiding 
Principles to his final report to the UN Human Rights Council, 65  and the 
Human Rights Council endorsed the Guiding Principles in its resolution 17/4 
of 16 June 2011.66 The second pillar of the UN’s ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ 
framework sets out the corporate responsibility to respect human rights as 
follows: ‘business enterprises should act with due diligence to avoid infringing 
on the rights of others and to address adverse impacts with which they are 
involved.’ 67  In this regard, the EP provides relevant private international 
financial institutions with the required ‘due diligence’ framework to identify, 
assess and manage project impacts by defining the processes and standards for 
stakeholder engagement with affected communities (including for indigenous 
peoples), labour rights, and occupational and community health and safety. The 
further requirement for project-level grievance mechanisms also allows 
affected communities to address grievances proactively with Project Sponsors, 
i.e., the borrowers of EPFI loans, which is an important component in driving 
greater accountability at project level.  
                                                        
65 A/HRC/17/31 
66  
67 Para.11 
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Within this context, it is important to note that the UN Business and Human 
Rights Framework has itself not been immune to criticism, especially as to the 
extent of its provision for grievance mechanisms to respond to alleged human 
rights abuses perpetrated by businesses. As Herz et al note, in his 2008 report 
to the UN Human Rights Council, 68  the Special Representative provided 
insights into how initiatives like the IFC Performance Standards (PS) and 
Equator Principles (EPs) can improve the human rights performance of project 
sponsors. The Special Representative affirmed that companies have a ‘baseline 
responsibility’ to respect all internationally recognized human rights.69 He then 
explained that corporations must do two things to ensure that they meet this 
baseline responsibility. First, they must implement a robust due diligence 
framework that will enable them to identify, prevent, and address adverse 
human rights impacts.70
 
This includes both substantive benchmarks to provide 
detailed guidance on acceptable outcomes and clear procedures to assess 
potential impacts, devise avoidance and mitigation strategies, and ensure that 
substantive standards are achieved. 71  Second, companies must ensure that 
stakeholders have access to effective grievance mechanisms to redress adverse 
human rights impacts.72 
 
The Special Representative has also noted that in 
order to fully discharge their responsibility to respect human rights, companies 
must provide a means for people who have had their rights adversely affected 
                                                        
68 Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, A/HRC/8/5 
7 April 2008. 
69 Protect, Respect and Remedy, paras. 24, 54.   
70 Ibid. at paras. 25, 56.   
71 Ibid., at paras. 61-63.   
72 Ibid., at paras. 93, 94. 
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by the company to seek redress. 73  Such grievance mechanisms may take a 
variety of forms: they may be specific to a given project or company, or they 
may be linked to multi-stakeholder or industry initiatives.74
 
Whatever form 
grievance mechanisms take, however, they must meet baseline due process 
standards to be credible and effective. At a minimum, a grievance mechanism 
must be legitimate, accessible, predictable, equitable, rights-compatible, and 
transparent.75  
 
Of all the institutions that adhere to the PS/EPs, only the IFC has an institution-
wide grievance mechanism that comes close to meeting the minimum due 
process standards articulated by the Special Representative, in the form of the 
IFC’s Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman (IFC/CAO).  The IFC/CAO operates 
under a set of fair, transparent and predictable grievance and dispute resolution 
procedures that explicitly empower it to consider claims based upon violations 
of international law.76 Despite considerable public pressure, the EPFIs have not 
adopted an analogous institution-wide grievance process. 77
 
The EPs only 
require project sponsors to establish a project-level grievance mechanism ‘to 
receive and facilitate resolution of the affected communities’ concerns and 
grievances about the client’s environmental and social performance’, 78  
whereas as noted above, the IFC operates both institution-wide as well project-
                                                        
73 Ibid., at paras. 82, 93.   
74 Ibid., at paras. 93, 100. 
75 Ibid., at para. 92. 
76 IFC Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman, Operational Guidelines, (2007) at 21. 
77 Protect, Respect and Remedy, op. cit., at para. 100. 
78 Equator Principle #6. 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level grievance mechanisms. 79  The grievance mechanisms contemplated by 
IFC’s Performance Standards meet the Special Representative’s minimum due 
process criteria insofar as they must be accessible, transparent and not impede 
access to judicial or administrative remedies.
 
Also, in other respects, these 
grievance mechanisms lack minimum substantive or procedural standards. For 
example, the PS/EPs do not require that the grievance mechanism be 
independent of the project sponsor to ensure legitimacy. To the contrary, the 
Guidance Notes anticipate that the mechanism will be staffed by the project 
sponsor and housed within its organizational structure. 80  Moreover, the 
PS/EPs do not specify acceptable procedures, time frames for hearing and 
resolving disputes, or appropriate remedies. And they do not require that the 
mechanism’s outcomes and remedies accord with internationally recognized 
human rights norms. Rather, all of these fundamental issues appear to be left 
to the unguided discretion of the sponsor. And in practice, many projects have 
received financing without a functioning grievance mechanism in place, let 
alone a rights-compliant one.
 
The voluntary nature of the Principles itself effectively means that the reach of 
the Principles depends on a given EPFI’s conscience, unless those trying to 
force compliance are able to mount a public shaming campaign of such 
magnitude as to force the EPFI to comply. Moreover, if the EPFI claims and the 
IFC finds that the project does comply with IFC Safeguards, procedural 
compliance alone may still be insufficient to ensure that private financial 
                                                        
79 IFC Performance Standard 1, para. 23. 
80 IFC Guidance Notes at 20. 
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institutions are financing projects less likely to cause social and environmental 
harm. On the other hand, the EPs nevertheless remain a stepping-stone to a 
future mechanism of more substantial, if not binding, commitments by 
financial non-state actors to responsible investing. Despite their shortcomings, 
such voluntary commitments create a forum in which interested non-state 
actors - individuals, NGOs and corporations - may participate actively in the 
development of corporate human rights responsibilities.  
Created as a result of voluntary commitments, the Equator Principles also 
invite corporations to develop and improve their own position on sustainable 
development. It is in this sense that the development and continued existence 
of voluntary commitments are not only crucial for the potential of NGO public 
shaming campaigns and access to formal adjudicatory venues, but are also an 
invaluable contribution to the corporate responsibility movement.81 
In recognition of a decade-long experience, application outcomes and 
stakeholder input, the EPs have undergone changes meant to share lessons 
learned, but also to proactively engage with evolving contemporary issues, 
concerns and stakeholders. Olaf and Acheta observe that at least three changes 
have occurred in the EP’s evolution: first, strategic changes, such as integrating 
evidence of climate change and greenhouse gas emissions into the EP scope and 
reporting; second, changes that followed modifications of the International 
Finance Corporation’s policies and guidelines as the basis for the EPs; and the 
third change addressed the consistency of the principles and support with the 
                                                        
81  Vivian Lee, Enforcing the Equator Principles: An NGO's Principled Effort to Stop the 
Financing of a Paper Pulp Mill in Uruguay, 6 Nw. J. Int'l Hum. Rts. 354 (2008) at 358. 
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implementation of the EPs, specifically, information sharing, country 
designation and language clarification.82  
 
Conclusions 
The initial results of a recent major research project entitled ‘rule of law 
dynamics’ inter alia maps the interaction between rule of law promotion 
(donor strategies) and rule of law conversion (the ways it is promoted and the 
ways it is received), and the relevance of rule of law diffusion (the modalities 
that cause the spread of expectation that one complies with the rule of law).83 
This research project found that both literature and practice pay too little 
attention to the recipient’s perspective and needs, resulting in failures in the 
rule of law conversion stage and its negative effect on the success of rule of law 
promotion programmes. One-size-fits-all programmes, top-down strategies, 
transplants by developed states of their own rule of law standards without the 
capacity of the recipient to cope with them, are still principal features of today’s 
rule of law promotion efforts. Almost no attention is paid in literature and 
practice to rule of law diffusion, i.e. the acceptance of the applicability of the 
rule of law, for example, to inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) and other 
international/transnational actors, with the resulting lack of legitimacy of rule 
of law promotion. Contemporary rule of law promotion strategies should 
                                                        
82  Weber, Olaf and Emmanuel Acheta, ‘The Equator Principles: Ten Teenage Years of 
Implementation and a Search for Outcome’, CIGI Papers No. 24. Waterloo, Ontario, Canada: 
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therefore be based on an understanding that rule of law promotion, conversion 
and diffusion are inextricably linked.  
 
In this paper a different type of rule of law dynamic is explored, namely, the 
dialectical relationship between public and private accountability mechanisms 
for ensuring that social and environmental risks of large natural resources 
development projects are successfully addressed, focusing on the grievance 
mechanisms required under EP Principle 6. The need for such mechanisms to 
be established arguably represents further evidence of the importance of the 
conversion and diffusion elements identified within the ‘rule of law dynamics’ 
paradigm described in the above research project. The findings of this paper 
also echo other, multi-disciplinary studies on the ten-year life span of the 
Equator Principles in concluding that there is a further need for a complaints 
mechanism against the private international finance institutions (EPFIs) that 
adopted these Principles.84  
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